

How Can the U.S. Army Overcome Intelligence Sharing Challenges Between Conventional and Special Operations Forces?

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Abstract

How Can the U.S. Army Overcome Intelligence Sharing Challenges Between Conventional and Special Operations Forces? by Major Michele H. Bredenkamp, U.S. Army, 51 pages.

The emphasis on the changing global environment, the complexity of emerging military operational requirements, the U.S. Army's Transformation Campaign Plan concept, and combined U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces operations has significantly increased over the past decade. Intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces is essential in successfully facing these challenges. The U.S. Army plans to adapt to the changes in the environment and expansion of military requirements through the Army's Transformation Campaign Plan. Under this plan, the Army seeks to transform to a knowledge-based force reliant on intelligence, which enhances situational understanding on the battlefield and fully supports the commander's decision-making process during military operations. U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces must improve intelligence sharing between one another to adapt to the changing global environment, the broad range of emerging military operational requirements throughout the world, and to fully support the U.S. Army's Transformation Campaign Plan.

This monograph examines why intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces is more important than ever and identifies solutions designed to enhance conventional forces capabilities and facilitate greater intelligence sharing with special operations forces. This study addresses how U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces can overcome intelligence sharing challenges through improvements in equipment, training, and interoperability. First, this paper analyzes the current operational environment that dictates the requirement for conventional and special operations forces to transform to achieve success during military operations. Furthermore, this paper examines the current doctrinal framework that guides intelligence sharing and dissemination within the U.S. Army and identifies different approaches and areas of emphasis between overall U.S. Army doctrine, conventional doctrine, and specific special operations doctrine. Additionally, this paper reviews various theories that support the increased need and importance of sharing intelligence between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces, and further identifies proposed methods to solve many of the challenges U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces encounter in intelligence sharing. This study also examines historical conflicts in Somalia, Kosovo and the most recent war in Afghanistan to illustrate how sharing intelligence directly impacts military operations. Lastly, this monograph provides possible recommendations and solutions addressing methods to improve intelligence sharing between conventional and special operations forces, through enhanced equipment, training, and interoperability.

This monograph primarily focuses on how the U.S. Army must improve conventional and special operations force capabilities to enhance intelligence sharing. Additionally, this paper recommends U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces strengthen their intelligence sharing capabilities through improvements in intelligence equipment, individual and organizational training, and interoperability with one another. Improvements in intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces will also support the Army's concept of transformation, which advocates the increased need for sharing intelligence between forces to adapt to and operate within a knowledge-centric operational environment. With the changing global surroundings, emerging military operational requirements, and the U.S. Army's transformation, Army conventional and special operations forces must improve their intelligence sharing to operate as an effective and integrated force capable of dominating the future battlefield.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Sharing intelligence between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces is essential in military operations, particularly due to the changing global environment and complexity of military operational requirements. The world is rapidly increasing in complexity and poses significant challenges to the U.S. Army. Military operations throughout the world are much more complicated, as the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war are often blurred and the potential threats are no longer clearly defined. To adapt to the demands of the changing environment, the U.S. Army is transforming to a knowledge-based force reliant on its Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities that are designed to provide dominant knowledge that enables understanding, decisive action, decision making, and compensates for the reduced physical protection.¹ Therefore, information dominance through intelligence sharing is essential to achieve success in military operations.

The U.S. Army Transformation Campaign Plan identifies the increased need for intelligence sharing because forces are now more interdependent on one another for information and intelligence to maintain situational understanding.² This monograph examines why intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces is more important than ever and identifies solutions designed to enhance conventional forces' capabilities and facilitate greater intelligence sharing with special operations forces. Chapter 1, the introduction, defines the structure of this monograph, describes the changing global environment, addresses the broad range of military operational requirements placed on the U.S. Army today, and describes the Army's concept to adapt to these changes through the Army Transformation Campaign Plan. First, this chapter reviews the structure of the study.

¹ Department of the Army. *Draft Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Annex to the Army Transformation Campaign Plan (ATCP)*. (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 2003) 4.

STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

The fundamental question this monograph examines is how U.S. Army conventional forces can increase their ability to share intelligence through improvements in equipment, training, and interoperability with special operations forces. Chapter 1 describes the changing environment, the broadening of emerging operational military requirements, and the U.S. Army's transformation that justifies the need to improve intelligence sharing between conventional and special operations forces. Additionally, this chapter outlines the organizational structure of the monograph that examines intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces through doctrine, theory, and history and describes the application of equipment, training, and interoperability as evaluation criteria throughout the study. Chapter 2 outlines the current doctrinal framework that guides intelligence sharing and dissemination within the U.S. Army and identifies different approaches and areas of emphasis between overall U.S. Army doctrine, conventional type doctrine, and specific special operations doctrine. Chapter 3 examines various theories that support the increased need and importance of sharing intelligence between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces, and furthermore, identifies proposed methods to solve many of the challenges U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces encounter in intelligence sharing. Chapter 4 reviews historical conflicts in Somalia, Kosovo and the most recent conflict in Afghanistan. This historical study illustrates how sharing intelligence directly impacts military operations. The final chapter of this monograph provides possible solutions and recommendations addressing methods to improve intelligence sharing between conventional and special operations forces, through enhanced equipment, training, and interoperability. This monograph primarily focuses on why and how U.S. Army must improve conventional force capabilities to enhance intelligence sharing with special operations forces, especially since intelligence sharing is becoming more essential than

² Department of the Army. *Army Intelligence Transformation Campaign Plan (AI-TCP)*. (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 2001) 24.

ever in enabling the U.S. Army to transform and adapt to emerging military operational requirements and the changing global environment.

THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

The rapidly changing global environment is increasingly complex. In the past, the U.S. Army faced clearly defined threats and operated in a bipolar environment, which provided the Army with a higher degree of predictability of the enemy and the environment in which threats would operate. Currently, the U.S. Army is challenged with significant changes as "the Army operates in a geostrategic environment of considerable instability, driven by significant demographic, economic and technological dynamics."³ As the global environment changes, U.S. Army forces will become more involved in non-traditional conflicts and face potential threats that are not easily identifiable and often use non-traditional means to accomplish their goals.⁴ These environmental changes will cause the U.S. Army to change to adapt and achieve success in military operations. First, this section will review the U.S. Army's role in non-traditional conflicts.

Since the Cold War, the U.S. Army experienced an increased involvement in non-traditional conflicts or operations other than war, as opposed to large conventional wars. U.S. Army forces were directly involved in non-traditional conflicts in Somalia, Kosovo and the current war in Afghanistan and within these environments, U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces often faced challenges in sharing intelligence and information.⁵ Through these non-traditional conflicts, the U.S. Army identified the fundamental need for increased interoperability and intelligence sharing between military forces to effectively operate as an integrated team, accomplish missions, and protect life. The global environment is changing due to competition for resources, religious extremism, ethnic conflicts, criminal activities, cultural

³ Ibid., 13.

⁴ Samuel P. Huntington. *The Clash of Civilizations*. (New York, NY: Touchstone Books, 1996) 36.

disputes, and terrorism.⁶ These struggles continue to influence the conditions in the global environment and pose a challenge to U.S. Army forces as they become more involved in non-traditional conflicts that arise from these disputes. Therefore, U.S. Army forces must improve intelligence sharing now, more than ever, to predict and prepare for non-traditional conflicts and identify possible global threats.

Potential U.S. threats are not always easily identifiable and may include traditional nation-states, as well as non-state actors that may not necessarily adhere to the laws of land warfare. As potential global threats become increasingly more difficult to identify, U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces must improve intelligence sharing. Additionally, non-traditional threats may use various methods of attack to highlight their causes by targeting major global powers and exploiting U.S. freedoms, while avoiding direct confrontation with military forces.⁷ Future U.S. conflicts may "prevail from the rise of highly networked non-state combatants and criminals, whose principle targets may, in many cases, be states."⁸ The 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on the U.S. clearly illustrates the non-traditional threats and global challenges the U.S. Army must be prepared to encounter. The U.S. Army must improve intelligence sharing between conventional and special operations forces to operate effectively against potential non-traditional threats.

As the global environmental changes, U.S. Army forces will become more involved in non-traditional conflicts and face difficulties in identifying potential threats, due to the threats' non-traditional methods of operation. These changes increase the uncertainty of the global environment and thereby necessitate a change in the way we operate within our battlespace.

⁵ Joseph D Celeski. "History of Special Forces Operations in Somalia: 1992-1995." *Special Warfare* (June 2002), 16-27.

⁶ Huntington, 42.

⁷ Ibid, 183.

⁸ John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt. *In Athena's Camp*. (Washington D.C.: National Defense Research Institute, 1997), 3.

MILITARY OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

The realities of the changing global environment impel the U.S. Army to adapt to the changes and remain engaged in a wide variety of missions throughout the world. As the environment changes, U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces must be prepared to operate within all levels of war and conduct operations within the same physical battlespace with one another. First, this section will address how the changing environment affects the way U.S. Army forces operate on the battlefield.

U.S. Army traditional levels of war were not always clearly defined, as U.S. Army conventional and special operations tactical actions on the battlefield affect operational and strategic aims and “operate within all levels of war.”⁹ With the increase in media attention, information operations campaigns, and highly technological equipment, U.S. Army actions on the battlefield directly affect tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. Actions by a brigade combat team, conducting tactical operations, may have strategic impact within the global community or a special forces team may collect intelligence of tactical value on the battlefield, rather than of direct strategic significance. The non-linear relationship between strategic-operational-tactical levels of war are clearly exemplified through stability operations and support operations in Bosnia, as soldiers on the ground enforced and affected international mandates and policy. “Due to the variant levels of war in the current environment, U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces can expect to operate in the same areas of operation in future conflicts; thereby increasing the importance of coordination and intelligence sharing.”¹⁰ U.S. Army forces are not only operating within all levels of war, the forces are also operating within the same physical battlespace, which increases the requirement for U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces to share intelligence.

⁹ Department of the Army, Field Manual 3.0: *Operations* (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 2001) 2-2.

¹⁰ Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-25, *Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces* (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999) 4-21.

Military operations in Somalia, Kosovo and the current conflict in Afghanistan illustrate how U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces operate amongst each other and identify the requirement for increased interoperability and intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces. Although U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces operate within the same physical area, they often fail to coordinate or share relevant information with one another.¹¹ Historical accounts reveal that “often times, conventional and special operations forces compartmentalize intelligence and lack integrated systems to synchronize efforts and deconflict friction within the area of operations.”¹² Unfortunately, these deficiencies ultimately place additional challenges on Army units, which hinder the speed of intelligence sharing and the effectiveness towards mission accomplishment. By integrating efforts to share intelligence, Army conventional and special operations forces will increase their ability to maintain superior situational understanding and information dominance, which are essential elements of future Army operations.¹³ Therefore, conventional and special operations forces must improve equipment connectivity, training with one another, and interoperability to increase their abilities to share intelligence and improve their effectiveness in operating as an integrated force, rather than separate entities.

As the global environment changes, U.S. Army forces are required to adapt and conduct a wide variety of military operations throughout the world. These environmental changes cause U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces to operate at all levels of war and often times, operate within the same physical battlespace. Therefore, the environment places greater demands on U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces to improve integration, interoperability, and intelligence sharing between them in order to operate more effectively. The

¹¹ Anthony H. Cordesman. *Lessons of Afghanistan: Warfighting, Intelligence, Force Transformation, Counterproliferation, and Arms Control*. (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2002) 46.

¹² Department of the Army, Field Manual 3.05-102: *Army Special Operations Forces Intelligence* (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 2001) A-3.

¹³ FM 3.0, 11-3.

U.S. Army's approach to adapt to the changes in the global environment is outlined in the Army's Transformation Campaign Plan.

TRANSFORMATION: THE ARMY'S CONCEPT TO CHANGE

As the global environment and military operational requirements in the world changes, the U.S. Army identified the need to transform and adapt to the changes. The U.S. Army Transformation Campaign Plan relies primarily on intelligence sharing and information dominance to achieve success. This section will address how the U.S. Army is transforming to a knowledge-centric force focused on providing commanders with intelligence and information for decision-making and achieving operational success. First, this section will review how the U.S. Army plans adapt to the changing environment with emphasis on its ability to operate as a knowledge-centric force.

Intelligence sharing and interoperability are essential for responsiveness and dominance on the battlefield. The U.S. Army's Transformation Campaign Plan is predicated upon "the Army's need to become more strategically responsive and dominant at every point on the spectrum of operations."¹⁴ Historically, the Army relied on overwhelming physical military power and combat equipment to defeat our adversaries. Through the U.S. Army's Transformation Plan, "the Army is developing a knowledge-centric warfighting concept that stakes its success on dominant understanding of the battlespace, gained through dominant knowledge."¹⁵ The Army's knowledge-centric concept relies primarily on its ability to collect, analyze, and share near-real time intelligence; establish connectivity and interoperability between units; and maintain superior situational understanding to achieve full spectrum dominance. "The Army places greater emphasis on obtaining near-certain knowledge to provide an advantage to commanders in visualizing, planning, and decision-making."¹⁶ Therefore, the value of sharing intelligence is more important than ever in the U.S. Army's concept of transformation, since intelligence is a key

¹⁴ DoD, AI-TCP, 8.

¹⁵ Ibid., 25.

element in maintaining information dominance and achieving success on the battlefield, particularly when U.S. Army forces are operating within the same area of operations.

U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces operate within the same battlespace more so now than in the past to support commanders and conduct integrated operations. Therefore, “it is essential they share intelligence to satisfy commanders' intelligence requirements, assist in establishing superior situational understanding for current operations, and more importantly, shape the battlespace for future operations.”¹⁶ To support the U.S. Army's transformation concept, conventional and special operations forces must develop an integrated approach to sharing intelligence. Intelligence sharing in the Transformation Plan is not only emphasized to obtain understanding of the battlespace, but more importantly to support the commander's decisions. “Sharing of intelligence and information is required to enable the commander to understand rather than merely see the battlespace and support commander's decisions.”¹⁷ Conventional and special operations forces are responsible for sharing relevant intelligence that may affect another force's mission or influence a commander's decision. By overcoming the challenges in sharing intelligence, conventional and special operations units will operate with an increased level of situational understanding, maintain a superior common operating picture between forces and improve the commanders' ability to make decisions. This will ultimately result in greater effectiveness towards mission accomplishment.

U.S. Army leaders designed the Army's Transformation Campaign Plan to enable U.S. Army forces with the ability to adapt to the changes in the global environment and military operational requirements throughout the world. The transformation concept relies on intelligence sharing between U.S. Army forces to function as a knowledge-centric force and provide

¹⁶ FM 3.0, 5-12.

¹⁷ FM 3.05-102, 3-16.

¹⁸ DoD, AI-TCP, 24.

commanders with effective intelligence that supports decision-making and achieves operational success.¹⁹

CONCLUSION

Due to the changing global environment, the complexity of emerging military operational requirements, and the U.S. Army's Transformation Campaign Plan concept, intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces is essential in achieving success in future military operations. This chapter addressed how the changing environment increases non-traditional conflicts in the world and allows for potential threats that are not easily identifiable and often use non-traditional means to accomplish their goals.²⁰ Additionally, this introduction illustrated the complexity and increasing range of military operational requirements for the U.S. Army, particularly as the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war are no longer distinctly clear and overlapped with one another. With the changes in the environment and expansion of military requirements, the U.S. Army plans to adapt through the Army's Transformation Campaign Plan. The Army plans to transform to a knowledge-based force reliant on intelligence that supports understanding and decision-making and is essential in achieving successful military operations.²¹ Therefore, U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces must improve intelligence sharing to adapt to the changing global environment, the broad range of emerging military operational requirements throughout the world, and to fully support the U.S. Army's Transformation Campaign Plan.

¹⁹ DoD, ATCP, 4.

²⁰ Huntington, 36.

²¹ DoD, ATCP, 4.

CHAPTER 2

DOCTRINE

According to U.S. Army doctrinal manual FM 3.0, *Operations*, "doctrine is the concise expression of how Army forces contribute to unified action in campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements; Army doctrine is authoritative, but not prescriptive."²² U.S. Army doctrine clearly serves as a basis for how conventional and special operations forces operate together and share intelligence information with one another. This is reflected in FM 3.0, which indicates, "Army doctrine provides a common language and a common understanding of how Army forces conduct operations."²³ Chapter 2 uses the current equipment, training, and interoperability inadequacies that exist in U.S. Army doctrine and affect intelligence sharing between units to evaluate doctrine in several areas. This chapter also illustrates the requirement for Army doctrine to emphasize intelligence sharing, particularly due to the Army's transformation to a knowledge-centric force more reliant on intelligence and situational understanding. Chapter 2 also examines the intelligence-sharing environment prescribed by current U.S. Army doctrine. First, this chapter reviews how well U.S. Army doctrinal field manuals support the concept of sharing intelligence.

APPROACHES TO SHARING INTELLIGENCE

Army doctrine recognizes the importance and increasing need for sharing intelligence at all levels to gain information superiority in our ever changing and complex environment. "The complexity of the operational environment requires sharing intelligence from the national level to the tactical level and among headquarters at each level."²⁴ The primary difference between Army conventional force doctrine and specific special operations doctrine, regarding intelligence sharing, is the approach the doctrinal manuals take to address the concept of sharing intelligence.

²² FM 3.0, 1-14.

²³ Ibid., 1-14.

²⁴ Ibid., 11-15.

U.S. Army doctrine identifies the importance of sharing intelligence to assist the commander in decision making and overall mission accomplishment. However, Army conventional and special operations doctrine approach intelligence sharing from different directions and with varied perspectives. Often, overall Army doctrine emphasizes the need for the unit or the staff to manage and disseminate intelligence to the commander, appropriate person or organization through an efficient management process. FM 3.0 identifies that information management planning by the staff ensures that Army forces are able to share relevant intelligence information vertically and horizontally, and provide it to the right person at the right time in a usable form to facilitate situational understanding and decision-making.²⁵ Conventional doctrine addresses the commander and staffs' role in operations, but emphasizes the staffs' role in the process to assist the commander. FM 71-100, *Division Operations*, clearly identifies the commander as the primary element responsible for all operations within a division. However, FM 71-100 states that the staff maintains the responsibility for developing products and the situation to help the commander see the battlefield and provide a basis for prosecuting his plan.²⁶ Special operations doctrine specifically addresses the commander and staffs' involvement in the process of sharing intelligence and an organization's ability to adapt to change and maintain flexibility when working with other units. Special operations Field Manual 3.05-102, *Army Special Operations Forces Intelligence*, cites that "successful intelligence support rests in the vision, leadership, skill, and judgment of the command and staff groups; a key to effectively sharing intelligence is adjusting to those intelligence differences that may affect the integrated employment of intelligence resources and sharing intelligence information."²⁷ Army doctrine seems to place much of the responsibility on the staff driving the process and establishing methods of managing information to support the command and the unit, whereas specific special

²⁵ Ibid., 11-21.

²⁶ Department of the Army. FM 71-100, *Division Operations*. (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993) Chapter 3.

²⁷ FM 3.05-102, A-5.

operations doctrine stresses the responsibilities of the commander and the staff in the intelligence sharing process.

Army doctrine clearly identifies that in order to conduct successful military operations, units are required to share intelligence in a timely manner, as well as provide intelligence to units that need the information to facilitate mission accomplishment. Common challenges such as classification levels, limited access, and sanitization affect unit abilities to share intelligence. Army doctrine, specifically within intelligence manuals, addresses these challenges, but does not clearly identify methods to quickly mitigate the problems and facilitate effective intelligence sharing with other forces. U.S. Army doctrine attempts to provide some method of resolution to the challenges that affect intelligence sharing, but does not emphasize the significance intelligence may have on operational missions; nor does it exemplify the ramifications that may occur if intelligence is not shared between organizations.²⁸ U.S. Army intelligence manual FM 34-2, *Collection Management and Synchronization Planning*, provides basic direction to Army forces facing classification or sanitization challenges. FM 34-2 states that "if an intelligence report exceeds the classification level of a unit's communication system or operating level the report should be sanitized after coordinating release, and then transmitted to the unit for effective use."²⁹ Most U.S. Army conventional doctrine does not specifically address sanitization or classification challenges that effect intelligence sharing, but rather makes reference to U.S. Army intelligence manuals. However, U.S. Army special operations doctrine addresses intelligence classification and sanitization. Field manual 3.05-102, provides brief instruction on sanitizing intelligence by citing that "when intelligence sources and methods cannot be shared, the intelligence should be provided after it is sanitized by effectively separating the information from the sources and the methods used to obtain it."³⁰ Although overall U.S. Army intelligence doctrine, as well as specific special operations doctrine, recognizes the issue of intelligence

²⁸ Department of the Army, Field Manual 34-2, *Collection Management and Synchronization Planning*. (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994) 3-20

²⁹ FM 34-2, 3-21.

sanitization, they do not emphasize or expound on the importance of quickly sanitizing or degrading classification levels to facilitate intelligence sharing with those who need it. By emphasizing timely sanitization of intelligence reports and developing clear doctrinal methods, units should be able to more readily share intelligence with the other. Army doctrine, to include special operations doctrine, addresses the relevance of sharing intelligence between forces, but each demonstrates the importance through different approaches.

Although U.S. Army doctrine addresses intelligence sharing, it must further emphasize the importance of sharing intelligence with all forces, specifically between conventional and special operations forces. To clearly illustrate the criticality of sharing intelligence, doctrine must emphasize the role of commander and the staff in the process and stress the importance of mitigating stovepiped intelligence to improve intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces.

DOCTRINAL PERSPECTIVE ON EQUIPMENT

U.S. Army doctrine addresses the impact that equipment has on intelligence sharing and illustrates the requirement for Army units to maintain reliable and secure equipment to share intelligence and information effectively. This section will illustrate that U.S. Army doctrine acknowledges the impact of equipment in the intelligence sharing process, but does not stress the importance of maintaining equipment compatibility to share intelligence and does not thoroughly address the complexities that information technology (IT) equipment imposes on units. First, this section will examine how U.S. Army doctrine addresses the importance of equipment in regards to sharing intelligence.

U.S. Army doctrine recognizes that improvements in IT equipment improve Army forces' abilities to share intelligence and will inherently change our operational environment. Special operations doctrine FM 3.05-102, illustrates this by discussing how technology changes our operational environment as developments in IT revolutionize how nations, organizations, and

³⁰ FM 3.05-102, A11.

people interact.³¹ Doctrine not only addresses how equipment will change our environment, but also how IT systems will improve our intelligence sharing capability. FM 3.0 comments that "modernizing efforts will increase the capability of Army forces to share a full-dimensional, highly accurate common operating picture and rapidly disseminate guidance, orders, plans, and intelligence."³² Additionally, U.S. Army intelligence doctrinal Field Manual 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, supports the idea that IT equipment will improve intelligence sharing and discusses how equipment systems prevented major leaps in the military's ability to process and share intelligence.³³ U.S. Army conventional doctrine also identifies the importance of modernized IT to improve intelligence sharing. Army Field Manual 71-3, *The Armor and Mechanized Infantry Brigade*, illustrates that digitization will enhance the flow of relevant combat information and sharing intelligence between units.³⁴ Army special operations doctrine also supports the concept that IT equipment will improve intelligence sharing through FM 3.05-102, which cites "the U.S. Army designed modernized IEW systems to rapidly disseminate critical intelligence between SOF, conventional, and national agencies."³⁵ Although various U.S. Army doctrinal manuals agree that IT equipment will alter our operational environment and increase the Army's ability to share intelligence, several doctrinal manuals do not address the issue of compatibility between equipment and systems, which is essential in enabling units to share intelligence.

Although U.S. Army doctrine addresses the significance of modernized IT equipment to share intelligence, doctrine does not clearly address the issue of intelligence system compatibility, which is also essential in enabling units to successfully share intelligence. Due to the rapid modernization of IT systems, developments occur at a much faster rate than fielding, training, and

³¹ Ibid., 1-17.

³² FM 3.0, 11-45.

³³ Department of the Army. Field Manual 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare*. (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001) Chapter 1.

³⁴ Department of the Army. Field Manual 71-3, *The Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade*. (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996) Appendix E.

³⁵ FM 3.05-102, 8-8.

utilization throughout the force.³⁶ Although Army conventional doctrine, such as FM 71-100, *Division Operations*, addresses how modernized IT equipment is rapidly changing and becoming more efficient for sharing intelligence, the manual does not address the challenge of maintaining equipment compatibility within the U.S. Army's modernization efforts.³⁷ If U.S. Army equipment is incompatible, its ability to share intelligence, interact with other forces and conduct effective operations will decrease. U.S. Army doctrine illustrates the importance of equipment in intelligence sharing, but does not clearly address the challenges of maintaining equipment compatibility, nor does it clearly address the complexities that accompany the modernized IT systems.

Technology provides the Army with an increased capability to rapidly share intelligence with greater detail and accuracy, but technology also adds digital complexity to the environment. Army leaders are important factors in managing, adapting, and integrating IT equipment into the force.³⁸ U.S. Army doctrine addresses the increased need for coordination, training, and leadership to integrate IT equipment into the force. FM 3.0 illustrates that although emerging user-friendly technologies facilitate coordinating, fusing, sharing, and displaying relevant information, these functions remain very human and current IT is no substitute for unit training and leadership.³⁹ Although the Army recognizes that IT equipment will increase the forces' capabilities, the Army must also temper modernization to ensure units maintain compatible equipment and the capability to operate complex IT systems. Additionally, since modernized equipment is often more complex, the Army must continue to focus on training to develop skills and competency in understanding and operating modernized IT equipment.⁴⁰ Equipment alone will not facilitate effective intelligence sharing and interoperability between forces; training U.S. Army forces is also an important factor.

³⁶ Stuart Johnson and Martin Libicki. *Dominant Battlespace Knowledge: The Winning Edge*. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University. 1995), 137.

³⁷ FM 71-100, Chapter 9.

³⁸ FM 3.0, 11-23.

³⁹ FM 3.0, 11-83.

TRAINING FOCUS

Training is an essential element of Army doctrine and is exemplified through many Army doctrinal manuals. Army manual FM 3.0 illustrates this through the statement that "effective training is the cornerstone of operational success and essential for a full-spectrum force."⁴¹ Unit training significantly affects organizations' abilities to share intelligence information and operate effectively with one another. Army doctrine addresses the importance of training and its affect on successful operations and is exemplified through Field Manual 7.0 *Training the Force*, which emphasizes the importance of training to establish interoperability, which is a vital component of proficiency, readiness and effective operations.⁴² Although Army doctrine acknowledges different aspects of training, only specific special operations doctrine stresses the human element of developing relationships and interpersonal skills during training and operations with other units; most Army doctrine does not specifically recognize its importance and link it to trained and ready units. Although Army training doctrine emphasizes the importance of training to increase the interoperability and intelligence sharing between units, special operations doctrine addresses training from a different approach by addressing the element of human relationships in the training process.

U.S. Army doctrine stresses the importance of training as a method to increase the efficiency and inter-workings of organizations. U.S. Army manual FM 3.0 illustrates that training improves organizations interoperability as, "teams gathered from different organizations do not execute efficiently unless trained to work together; training emphasizes teamwork and adaptability."⁴³ Several U.S. Army doctrinal manuals describe training as a tool or method by which organizations use to synchronize efforts and adapt to one another for increased effectiveness. One example in FM 7.0 states that, "Army doctrine requires teamwork, which

⁴⁰ FM 3.0, 11-24.

⁴¹ FM 3.0, 1-17.

⁴² Department of the Army, Field Manual 7.0, *Training the Force* (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002) 11-5.

⁴³ FM 3.0, 2-76.

training and practice develops and results in increased effectiveness, proficiency and cohesiveness between units.’⁴⁴ Training to build teams, adapt to each organization's operating methods, and to synchronize efforts will also increase a unit's ability to share intelligence with one another. Army doctrine, to include conventional and special operations doctrine, address the importance of training between units to facilitate interoperability and intelligence sharing.

U.S. Army doctrine demonstrates the significance of training personnel and developing specific Army training programs to enhance individual unit effectiveness. Army training manual FM 7.0 illustrates the “importance of training personnel through the Army’s Leader Training and Development Model (ALTDM) (Figure 1) to develop trained and ready units capable of operating in any environment.’⁴⁵ The Army’s Leader Training and Development Model recognizes the importance of integrating the Army’s culture or shared set of beliefs, values, and assumptions into training, although it does not identify the need to train and develop Army personnel on cultural and interpersonal skills that enhance soldiers’ abilities to operate more effectively with other units.⁴⁶ Although the ALTDM focuses on individual training in Army culture, FM 7.0 addresses individual and organizational training to improve relationships and understanding. FM 7.0 illustrates training as a method of developing mutual appreciation for other capabilities, and the development of valuable personal and professional relationships among units, but does not emphasize its criticality in maintaining interoperability with other units.⁴⁷ Most Army conventional doctrinal manuals for division and brigade level operations do not identify the importance of training as a method to improve interoperability and intelligence sharing between units. Although FMs 71-3, 71-100, and 7-30, *The Infantry Brigade* address various types of units conventional Army forces may operate with, the manuals do not specifically identify the importance of training in relation to intelligence interoperability and sharing. However, special

⁴⁴ FM 7.0, 2-9.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 11-2.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 11-2.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 5-12.

operations doctrine accentuates the importance of personal interaction through training to facilitate interoperability and intelligence sharing between units.




Figure 1 - Army Training and Leader Development Model⁴⁸

Special operations doctrine addresses the importance in using training as a method to develop effective organizations. FM 3.05-102 cites "personnel to interact with one another effectively and to give them the ability to gain insight into the attitudes, beliefs, and culture of an organization."⁴⁹ Although special operations personnel operate with multinational forces more frequently than conventional forces and therefore, must take into account various cultures, beliefs and customs, their approach to training by emphasizing humanistic skills is essential and should be emphasized in Army training doctrine. FM 3.05-102 identifies that "special operations training cause personnel to use their interpersonal skills and experience to persuade each element to coordinate their efforts."⁵⁰ Additionally, special operations doctrine reflects the importance of using training as a method to educate personnel, facilitate understanding, and develop relations between units, which in turn increases unit efficiency.⁵¹ Through training, units will establish a

⁴⁸ Ibid., 11-20.

⁴⁹ FM 3.05-102, 1-6.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 1-7.

⁵¹ FM 100-25.

common understanding and develop enhanced relations, which will ultimately improve their desire to share intelligence with their military counterparts.

Army doctrine addresses the importance of training to increase soldier and unit effectiveness. FM 7.0 identifies the increased need to train U.S. Army forces due to the integration of complex IT systems and the changing nature of our operational environment.⁵² Due to the emphasis on intelligence sharing in an Army force that is transforming to become more reliant on intelligence and focused on operating as a knowledge-centric force, training personnel to share intelligence is more critical than ever.⁵³ Army doctrine clearly emphasizes the need for training to be all encompassing in leadership, technical, and tactical skills, but should also specify the importance of training and developing the cultural and interpersonal skills of soldiers and organizations to understand and operate effectively with one another, as illustrated in special operations doctrine. A well-balanced training program can only serve to improve interoperability across the spectrum of Army units.

ACHIEVING INTEROPERABILITY

Army leaders realize that interoperability between units is essential to successfully share intelligence information and accomplish missions. The Department of Defense defines interoperability in Field Manual 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, as "the condition achieved among communication-electronics systems or items of communications-electronic equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users."⁵⁴ Interoperability should not be limited strictly to communications and electronic systems, but account for culture, organizational values, and relationships, since these elements directly affect the level of interoperability between units. Although Army doctrine addresses the need for interoperability in today's operations, many conventional doctrinal

⁵² FM 7.0, Preface.

⁵³ DoD, ATCP, 4.

manuals focus on the technological requirements of establishing interoperability. However, special operations doctrine clearly emphasizes the need to attain interoperability through equipment, developing relationships, and establishing liaisons, and also identifies the essential need for interoperability to improve intelligence sharing between units.

Special operations doctrine identifies that interoperability is essential for operational success, particularly in sharing intelligence information. FM 3.05-102 illustrates that, "interoperability, streamlined information, and pull-down intelligence tailored to the needs of Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) are key to successful intelligence systems support."⁵⁴ Special operations doctrine also addresses the importance of maintaining liaisons to facilitate interoperability and greater coordination for operations and intelligence sharing between units. According to FM 3.05-102, liaisons known as the Special Operations Command and Control Elements (SOCCE) are an integral part of ensuring that conventional and special operations forces maintain interoperability, which allows for sharing intelligence between units. SOCCEs can provide real-time combat information and intelligence to assist conventional forces with information they may otherwise not receive.⁵⁵ Special operations doctrine addresses the importance of establishing interoperability through humanistic means of developing relations and establishing liaisons, as well as addressing the role of equipment in interoperability. Army conventional force doctrine tends to primarily focus more on the technological aspect of interoperability and does not always identify the human factors that are necessary for successful interoperability and intelligence sharing between units.

Various U.S. Army conventional force doctrinal manuals do not always address the issue of developing shared relationships between forces, when possible, that will enhance a unit's interoperability and desire to share intelligence effectively. One exception is U.S. Army Field Manual 17-95, *Cavalry Operations*, which illustrates the importance of developing special

⁵⁴ Department of the Army, Field Manual 1-02 (Draft), *Operational Terms and Graphics* (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003).

⁵⁵ FM 3.05-102, 8-3.

relationships, understanding capabilities, and maintaining interoperability to facilitate the flow and use of combat information.⁵⁷ Although FM 17-95 identifies the link between strong relationships with interoperability and intelligence sharing, most other U.S. Army conventional force doctrinal manuals do not adequately address their relevance to one another. Several other conventional doctrinal manuals focus on systems, technology, or transformational concepts rather than the human aspect of interoperability and sharing intelligence. Field Manual 71-100-2, *Infantry Division Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures*, addresses the need to establish liaison elements with other units to facilitate planning, but vaguely addresses the importance of developing relations to achieve interoperability and share intelligence.⁵⁸ FM 71-100-2 emphasizes the importance of digitization and equipment, rather than developing improved relations between units to facilitate interoperability. FM 71-100-2 exemplifies this by suggesting that automation equipment greatly assists units in establishing interoperability and rapidly disseminating intelligence.⁵⁹ On the other hand, special operations doctrine demonstrates the importance of relationships and their effects on intelligence sharing between organizations, but focuses on relationships with multi-national units rather than with U.S. Army units.⁶⁰ Special operations doctrine does not focus on transformational intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) concepts, but stresses the importance of relationships and the human aspect of sharing intelligence.

U.S. Army doctrine fully recognizes that Army force commanders will face complex demands in dealing with interoperability challenges and also identifies the importance of interoperability between units conducting military operations.⁶¹ Although Army doctrine illustrates the importance of interoperability, most conventional doctrine primarily focuses on the

⁵⁶ FM 3.05-102, 3-67.

⁵⁷ Department of the Army. Field Manual 17-95, *Cavalry Operations* (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996) Chapter 9, Section XI.

⁵⁸ Department of the Army. FM 71-100-2, *Infantry Division Operations: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*. (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993) Section II.

⁵⁹ Ibid., Section I.

⁶⁰ FM 100-25.

⁶¹ FM 3.0, 2-45.

technological requirements, rather than also addressing the human factors that are also essential in achieving interoperability. Specific special operations doctrine clearly emphasizes the importance of interoperability and identifies several methods to improve interoperability by enhancing equipment, relationships, and liaisons.⁶² By improving interoperability, conventional and special operations forces will enhance their abilities to improve intelligence sharing. Additionally, as the Army transforms to a force that is reliant on maintaining the ability to operate more closely through shared intelligence to succeed in a knowledge-centric environment, the role of interoperability in the future is more significant than ever.

CONCLUSION

Throughout Chapter 2, this study illustrated how U.S. Army doctrine supports the concept of sharing intelligence through a common doctrinal framework, but with different approaches for conventional and special operations forces. Chapter 2 reviewed how U.S. Army conventional and special operations doctrine approached intelligence sharing and addressed the elements of equipment, training, and interoperability and how they relate to intelligence sharing. As U.S. Army conventional doctrine focused more on equipment technology, systematic training and procedures, and interoperability through systems, specific special operations doctrine presented a different approach by addressing the importance cultural training and achieving interoperability through several factors other than equipment to improve intelligence sharing. Additionally, conventional Army doctrine did not stress the criticality of sharing intelligence, particularly in regards to the emphasis that is placed on intelligence in the current transformation of the Army to a force that is more reliant on intelligence. Chapter 2 illustrated that the concept of intelligence sharing between units is not accentuated enough in relation to the importance intelligence will have on the future knowledge-centric Army force.⁶³ Although current Army doctrine identifies that "U.S. forces should share all relevant and pertinent intelligence about the

⁶² FM 3.05-102, 3-67.

⁶³ DoD, ATCP, 4.

situation and adversary to attain the best-possible common understanding of threatened interests, determine relevant and attainable objectives, and to achieve unified efforts against the adversary;"⁶⁴ emerging Army doctrine should address the significance of intelligence in future operations and identify methods to improve the forces' capability to share intelligence through equipment, training, and interoperability to operate more effectively and efficiently.

⁶⁴ FM 3.05-102, A9.

THEORY

Sharing intelligence has always been an important factor in military operations and its significance is increasing due to the Army's transformation to a knowledge-centric force that is more reliant on information dominance.⁶⁵ Chapter 3 examines academic views on sharing intelligence and their continuing application to the transformation of U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces. This chapter will review the differences between several authors' theories that attempt to explain why U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces face great difficulty in sharing intelligence. The authors disagree on the primary cause that hinders forces from sharing intelligence, which range from a lack of technological equipment, inadequate training, and the inability to establish interoperability. Chapter 3 will also examine proposed methods to improve equipment, training, and interoperability, which the authors believe are required to improve intelligence sharing. The sources reviewed within this paper support the increased need to improve intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces, particularly due to the rapid changes and complexity of the global environment. First, this chapter will examine various theories that explaining why U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces are challenged in sharing intelligence with one another.

DIFFICULTIES IN SHARING INTELLIGENCE

A challenge the U.S. Army consistently faces during military operations is sharing intelligence between forces. Many academics and military personnel express differing opinions regarding the primary cause of these challenges; although they agree the difficulties stem from equipment, training, and interoperability between forces. This section will begin by reviewing theories on the role of equipment in intelligence sharing.

⁶⁵ DoD, AI-TCP, 14.

In *Dominant Battlespace Knowledge*, political scientist Paul Bracken illustrated his theory that intelligence sharing is difficult because of challenges in information management systems that are primarily caused by equipment. Bracken commented that "problems in sharing intelligence are primarily within managing the synergy of information and intelligence with responsiveness and efficiency with equipment; organizing information storage and processing is the problem, not coordination of operating forces."⁶⁶ Therefore, Bracken believed equipment was the primary reason U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces faced difficulties in sharing intelligence.⁶⁷ Additionally, in *Doomed to Fail*, John Gentry agreed that equipment caused vulnerability and failure in sharing intelligence. Gentry suggested that the U.S. Army's information technology equipment and infrastructure regularly fails and contributes virtually nothing to military operations, but high costs and limitations.⁶⁸ Therefore, Gentry advocated that equipment complexities and shortfalls affect the U.S. Army's ability to adequately share intelligence. Although many academics expressed their beliefs that equipment impacts the U.S. Army's ability to share intelligence, others believe that training has a more profound impact on intelligence sharing.

In *Fighting For the Future*, Ralph Peters argued that the primary challenge in sharing intelligence is not due to equipment difficulties, but a lack of training and educating soldiers. The author cites that "the core of our force is the soldier."⁶⁹ Peters did not believe that equipment degrades or overcomplicates the U.S. Army's ability to share intelligence because the U.S. is far technologically superior to the rest of the world. On the contrary, Peters argued that the challenges are embedded in people, as untrained U.S. Army personnel degrade intelligence sharing.⁷⁰ The author also proposed "the U.S. Army has fallen into the old American trap of

⁶⁶ Johnson and Libicki, 75.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 60.

⁶⁸ John Gentry. "Doomed to Fail: America's Blind Faith in Military Technology". *Parameters* (Winter 2002), 91.

⁶⁹ Ralph Peters. *Fighting for the Future: Will America Triumph?* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999) 144.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 46

seeking technological solutions to human problems."⁷¹ Peters did not agree that the U.S. Army must invest heavily in its machines and equipment, but should focus on increased training and education to improve intelligence sharing between U.S. conventional and special operations forces.⁷² In *Unconventional Warfare*, the author Susan Marquis also believed that lack of proper training hinders intelligence sharing between conventional and special operations forces. Marquis argued, "conventional military commanders are unaware and not trained in special operations force's capabilities, possibly due to mistrust, lack of information, or competing interests and therefore, have misused special operations forces."⁷³ Marquis clearly faulted conventional forces lack of training and understanding without addressing the responsibility of special operations forces in achieving full integration between forces.⁷⁴ The academics reviewed throughout this section believed the lack of training degrades U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces' ability to share intelligence. However, the authors' approaches explaining the cause in intelligence sharing difficulties varied as some focused on training individual operators and others focused on training commanders to understand capabilities and directly affect intelligence sharing. Additionally, several academics advocated that the lack of interoperability causes difficulty in sharing intelligence between conventional and special operations forces.

The academics reviewed in this study, agreed that interoperability is a key element in successfully sharing intelligence and only through people and effective relations, can the U.S. Army achieve interoperability. These ideas are not original and reflect the views of the classic military theorist, Ardant du Picq, who wrote "the value of the soldier is the essential element of success; let us strengthen the soldier."⁷⁵ Du Picq's theory is exemplified through several opinions that agree human nature and organizational culture elicit a lack of interoperability and intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces. Ralph Peters

⁷¹ Ibid., 19.

⁷² Ibid, 55.

⁷³ Susan Marquis. *Unconventional Warfare* (Washington, D.C.: Virginia Press, 1997), 264.

⁷⁴ Ibid, 265.

commented that the U.S. Army cannot focus on hardware and equipment alone because the more difficult and subtle problems in interoperability and intelligence sharing are posed by more complex elements of human behavior within soldiers and organizations.⁷⁶ Therefore, Peters suggested that interoperability between personnel and organizations directly influences intelligence sharing between U.S. Army forces. Susan Marquis reinforced Peters' argument that people are the core of interoperability and sharing intelligence. Marquis indicated that the differences in organizational values and cultures generate separation between special operations forces and the conventional Army, thereby provoking challenges in interoperability between them.⁷⁷ Marquis' also believes that these differences between organizations hinder interoperability, as well as, intelligence sharing between conventional and special operations forces.

This section revealed differing academic theories regarding the primary cause of sharing intelligence. The academic views varied as to the primary cause of the difficulties that U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces face in intelligence sharing. However, all academics reviewed and acknowledged that complications in equipment, training, and interoperability contributed to degraded intelligence sharing between forces. Next, this section will review proposed theories to improve intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces.

PROPOSED METHODS OF IMPROVEMENT

Several academics reviewed throughout this chapter provided different opinions regarding the primary reason conventional and special operations units face difficulties in sharing intelligence. The authors also differed as to whether the U.S. Army should focus on improving equipment, training, or interoperability to alleviate intelligence sharing difficulties. This section

⁷⁵ Ardant Du Picq. *Battle Studies: Roots of Strategy* 2. (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1986), 143.

⁷⁶ Peters, 45.

⁷⁷ Marquis, 47.

will review advocates who promote improvements in technological equipment to enhance intelligence sharing between conventional and special operations units.

Author Jeffrey Cooper of *Dominant Battlespace Knowledge* advocated improvements in technology and equipment as a primary means to improve intelligence sharing. Cooper argued that automated systems will replace soldiers and equipment alone will improve the flow of intelligence.⁷⁸ Contrary to Cooper's opinion, Dr. David Alberts of *Dominant Battlespace Knowledge* recognized that "the military needs a balance between investments in command and control technology, equipment, training, and education in order to improve sharing of information."⁷⁹ Additionally, other authors published in *Dominant Battlespace Knowledge* addressed the importance of maintaining equipment to correlate and parse information out, but also acknowledge the fact that technology will never substitute the human element in warfare, which requires education and training for personnel to achieve interoperability and meet specific objectives.⁸⁰ Although equipment and technology are important enablers for conventional and special operations forces, many academics believed the best method of increasing intelligence sharing between forces is through improved training and interoperability.

Ralph Peters emphasized the importance of educating and training soldiers to improve interoperability and increase relevant intelligence sharing between U.S. Army forces. Peters advocated that "the U.S. Army needs to study and train soldiers on the behavior of individuals and organizations, because technology will not always be the answer to our dilemmas."⁸¹ The author believed the U.S. Army will only improve intelligence sharing through training soldiers to operate with one another and to understand the processes, methods, and value of intelligence. Susan Marquis also advocated increased training between conventional and special operations forces. The author supported the concept that training reinforces distinct ways of thinking,

⁷⁸ Johnson and Martin Libicki. *Dominant Battlespace Knowledge*. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1995) 105.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 85.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 96.

⁸¹ Peters, 194.

establishes integration, and will improve interoperability during military operations between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces.⁸² Marquis believed that due to the different nature of U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces, they require improved combined training to enhance their familiarity and understanding of the other. The author specifically recommended the U.S. Army improve methods of training and educating conventional commanders to understand special operations, which will in turn increase intelligence sharing between forces.⁸³ Peters and Marquis advocated improvements in training as methods to strengthen intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces, as well as to improve interoperability.

The academics reviewed throughout this chapter agreed that interoperability is essential in improving intelligence sharing between U.S. Army forces. Ralph Peters illustrated that equipment, training, and interoperability contribute to improved intelligence sharing between conventional and special operations forces. The author identified that improving technology was not the only method of achieving interoperability; improving the training and education of people and organizations were essential in establishing interoperability and facilitating understanding.⁸⁴ Furthermore, Peters advocated that improvements in equipment and training will also enhance interoperability, as well as enhance intelligence sharing between U.S. Army forces.⁸⁵ Susan Marquis also promoted a similar view of the role of interoperability in intelligence sharing. The author illustrated this through her comment that "organizations can only achieve and maintain interoperability through understanding and training with one another."⁸⁶ Marquis further identified that organizations must recognize they are different and therefore, must work together to establish interoperability with the other, which will allow them to integrate as a team and

⁸² Marquis, 47.

⁸³ Ibid, 45.

⁸⁴ Peters, 65.

⁸⁵ Ibid 45.

⁸⁶ Marquis, 246.

achieve U.S. political and military objectives.⁸⁷ The authors' clearly illustrated the importance of interoperability as an enabling factor for U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces in sharing intelligence more effectively.

The authors' addressed throughout this section proposed improvements in interoperability as a means to strengthen the sharing of intelligence between U.S. Army forces. The authors presented the elements of equipment and training as primary factors that will enable forces to achieve interoperability, and in turn, improve intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces.

CONCLUSION

Several academics developed theories that address the challenges of sharing intelligence between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces. Chapter 3 examined the writings of these various academics and illustrated the different views they presented in determining the difficulties of sharing intelligence between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces. The academics' revealed that the primary reasons U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces are challenged with sharing intelligence were due to difficulties in the Army's equipment, training, and interoperability with one another. This chapter also reviewed the authors' proposals on how to improve the sharing of intelligence, through improvements in technological equipment, training between forces, and overall interoperability between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces. Many of the authors' opinions differed regarding the primary reason conventional and special operations are challenged in sharing intelligence. However, the authors agreed that through improvements in equipment, training, and interoperability, conventional and special operations forces will increase their ability to share intelligence and operate more effectively in future military operations.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 248.

HISTORY

History reveals lessons and provides examples of past military actions that can contribute towards improvement in the future of the U.S. Army. Chapter 4 reviews historical conflicts and illustrate the challenges U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces faced in sharing intelligence while conducting military operations in combat and peacekeeping environments. This chapter also examines the effects that the lack of intelligence sharing had on military operations and will specifically address examples in Somalia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan that involved both U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces. These examples demonstrate the value of sharing intelligence and information in support of military operations, particularly in combat operations. Additionally, these historical examples present challenges conventional and special operations forces faced in sharing intelligence, as well as identify situations where intelligence was successfully shared between units. Chapter 4 primarily reviews how equipment, training, and interoperability affected U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces' abilities to adequately share intelligence during these military operations. First, this chapter examines the U.S. Army's ability to share intelligence between conventional and special operations forces during the conflict in Somalia.

SOMALIA: OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

Several academics presented their views and opinions on intelligence sharing during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia through various publications. The authors referenced in this section primarily agree that intelligence sharing between conventional and special operations forces did not initially occur, due to equipment, training, and interoperability challenges; but gradually improved throughout the operation. The first work of this chapter discusses lessons from Major David Shelton.

David Shelton clearly presented his thoughts regarding the challenges forces faced in sharing intelligence throughout his writings in *Intelligence Lessons of Restore Hope*. Shelton discussed the equipment difficulties intelligence and operations personnel encountered in Somalia. Many of the intelligence information hardware systems and software programs that units were utilizing were not always compatible with other units operating in Somalia and adversely impacted the flow of intelligence at times.⁸⁸ Additionally, forces faced a plethora of connectivity and hardware difficulties with their equipment, and most of the hardware systems used to share intelligence required substantial amount of operator expertise and training, which many of the soldiers did not possess prior to deployment.⁸⁹ Therefore, the lack of training and familiarity with equipment, and with other units, degraded some of the units' abilities to share intelligence. Shelton also identified how classification levels limited interoperability and hindered the release of relevant intelligence to organizations and operators who required the intelligence to conduct military operations.⁹⁰ Shelton recognized the requirement of forces to maintain security of missions, but also advocated a review of classification levels during combat operations to encourage common understanding and interoperability between units involved in the conflict.⁹¹ Author Joseph Celeski also addressed intelligence sharing challenges that occurred in Somalia.

Joseph Celeski presented intelligence sharing difficulties conventional and special operations forces faced in Somalia in his article, *Special Forces Operations in Somalia*. Celeski suggested that although special operations forces were the primary source of all intelligence, they did not share intelligence with conventional forces because of classification and access requirements. Although special operations forces collected information, the intelligence was not always disseminated and led conventional forces to encounter unexpected resistance from armed

⁸⁸ David L. Shelton. "Intelligence Lessons: Operations Restore Hope Somalia" *Marine Corps Gazette*, 79/2 (Winter 1995), 37-40.

⁸⁹ Ibid, 38.

⁹⁰ Ibid. 38.

⁹¹ Ibid, 40.

Somali factions during Operation Restore Hope.⁹² Celeski also identified that conventional and special operations forces were not familiar with each other's operating procedures, which reflected the lack of coordination and training between forces.⁹³ Celeski pointed out that as the conflict in Somalia continued, conventional and special operations forces became more familiar with each other's procedures, which improved interoperability and intelligence sharing.⁹⁴ Additionally, Major Clifford Day revealed the difficulties of sharing intelligence in Somalia.

Clifford Day revealed that intelligence sharing struggles existed throughout operations in Somalia due to information management difficulties and compartmentalization. Day discussed the challenges units and agencies faced in obtaining intelligence, and faulted the complex system of equipment as part of the problem. Many of the systems could only achieve connectivity through satellite links and often did not function properly, therefore many problems revolved around dissemination.⁹⁵ Additionally, Day acknowledged that units were unfamiliar with operating with one another and compartmentalized intelligence, which degraded interoperability and sharing of information.⁹⁶ Day believes "intelligence in Somalia was not synchronized for unity of effort to share all relevant and pertinent intelligence about the situation and adversary to attain the best common understanding of threatened interests, and determine relevant and attainable objectives for achieving mission success."⁹⁷ Overall, Day credited U.S. failures in Somalia partially to the lack of intelligence sharing between forces during Operation Restore Hope.

Several authors believe U.S. forces in Somalia could have operated more effectively and efficiently with increased sharing of intelligence. The various sources revealed difficulties with incompatible equipment, a lack of training, and reduced interoperability between units as

⁹² Celeski. 19.

⁹³ Ibid, 30.

⁹⁴ Ibid, 19.

⁹⁵ Clifford Day. *Defeat of Task Force Ranger*. (Maxwell AFB: AL. Air Command and Staff College, 1997) 27.

⁹⁶ Ibid, 28.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 28.

contributing to the negative effects U.S. forces faced in Operation Restore Hope. Next, this chapter will review methods of intelligence sharing between conventional and special operations forces in Kosovo.

KOSOVO: TASK FORCE FALCON

Although U.S. military operations in Kosovo were focused on peacekeeping, U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces faced challenges in sharing intelligence during the initial phases of the operation. U.S. Army forces overcame these challenges rather quickly by focusing on correcting equipment, training, and interoperability problems they initially encountered. This section will reveal how U.S. Army conventional and special operations units successfully shared intelligence in Kosovo and will begin by reviewing *10th Special Forces in Kosovo*.

Robert Schaefer and M. Davis' account of U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces operations in Kosovo presented a positive view of successful intelligence sharing during operations. The authors discuss how robust equipment packages and intelligence architecture enabled conventional and special operations forces to share intelligence. U.S. Army forces were well equipped with compatible systems, clear connectivity, and redundant communications that facilitated coordination and integration between conventional and special operations forces.⁹⁸ Additionally, Schaefer and Davis attributed successful intelligence sharing to training and familiarization between conventional and special operations forces prior to deployment, as each force established relationships and interoperability. The use of liaison and coordination elements significantly improved the interoperability and facilitated sharing intelligence between conventional and special operations forces.⁹⁹ The authors believed that "these liaison elements proved to be invaluable in ensuring interoperability and real-time, redundant communications link

⁹⁸ Robert W. Schaefer and M. Davis. "10th SF Group Keeps Kosovo Stable." *Special Warfare*, (June 2002), 52-55.

⁹⁹ *Ibid*, 53.

between Task Force Falcon."¹⁰⁰ Successful interoperability significantly increased intelligence sharing, and enabled both conventional and special operations forces in Task Force Falcon to work towards a common goal. Timothy Thomas also provides insight to intelligence sharing operations in Kosovo.

Timothy Thomas addressed initial intelligence sharing challenges U.S. Army units faced in Kosovo. Additionally, Thomas identifies solutions that attempted to correct the problems encountered during the conflict. Thomas indicated that U.S. Army forces operated with improved technological equipment, which facilitated the U.S. Army's success in sharing intelligence in Kosovo.¹⁰¹ He stated that "the equipment did not always function all the time with perfection, but the vast number of systems allowed for rapid collection and collation into intelligence that was rapidly disseminated."¹⁰² Thomas believed the equipment provided U.S. forces a greater capability to share intelligence and also identified the importance of training to share intelligence effectively.¹⁰³ The author stated that U.S. Army forces were well trained in their ability to share intelligence by passing target information and using equipment properly, but the human dimension in handling information was not stressed.¹⁰⁴ Thomas identified U.S. Army equipment and training as positive elements that contributed to the success in sharing intelligence between U.S. Forces in Kosovo.

Various authors believe U.S. forces in Kosovo were able to successfully share intelligence due to modernized intelligence equipment, sufficient training, and interoperability between units. Although intelligence sharing will never occur with perfection, there are ways to achieve success as demonstrated through U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces in Kosovo. The final review of this chapter will examine intelligence-sharing challenges in the most recent conflict in Afghanistan.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 53.

¹⁰¹ Timothy Thomas. "Kosovo and the Myth of Information Superiority". *Parameters*, (Spring 2000), 5

¹⁰² Ibid, 5.

¹⁰³ Ibid, 10.

AFGHANISTAN: OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

The conflict in Afghanistan appears to place greater importance on the value of sharing intelligence in military operations, due to the complexity of the environment, the threat, and the increased number of intelligence collectors on the battlefield. Although the war on terrorism is still occurring, several academics introduced their views on intelligence sharing during the initial stages of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). This section of Chapter 5 will review works that share a common theme amongst all cited authors and reveal intelligence sharing challenges between conventional and special operations forces in Afghanistan. The authors demonstrated that difficulties occurred primarily due to equipment problems, lack of training, and interoperability challenges, although intelligence sharing has continually improved throughout the operation. The first work of this section discusses are *Lessons from Afghanistan* by Anthony H. Cordesman.

Anthony Cordesman presented lessons from OEF that clearly illustrated the intelligence sharing challenges U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces faced during the initial stages of combat. Cordesman addressed the difficulties each force encountered with equipment used to communicate and share intelligence information. The equipment U.S. Army forces initially deployed to Afghanistan with was not always fully compatible with one another or capable of operating in the harsh environment.¹⁰⁵ Cordesman identified how the lack of bandwidth inhibited U.S. communications and ISR capabilities and negatively affected intelligence sharing between conventional and special operations forces.¹⁰⁶ Additionally, environmental problems affected conventional force communications and processing equipment; therefore intelligence was not always disseminated between forces until operable equipment was introduced into theater. Often times, personnel were unfamiliar with and lacked training on the newly introduced equipment, which also hindered the unit's ability to share intelligence.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 11.

¹⁰⁵ Cordesman, 45.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 46.

Cordesman also cited that units did not train together prior to deploying to Afghanistan and were unfamiliar with methods and operating procedures and did not establish cohesion with one another until later in the operation. Additionally, the 101st Air Assault Division's *Lessons Learned Briefing* validated Cordesman's comment and identified the "requirement to train and practice interoperability between conventional and special operations forces."¹⁰⁷

Cordesman also addressed the lack of interoperability between forces during OEF and illustrated his point through military actions that occurred during Operation Anaconda. Cordesman articulated that compartmentalization of intelligence hindered operations during Anaconda, as up-to-date intelligence information on enemy and friendly positions was not relayed to conventional ground forces, or 10th Mountain Division.¹⁰⁸ Although intelligence collectors obtained information from Afghan sources, the information was questionable and was not effectively disseminated and ground commanders were forced to alter battle plans, adapt to a rapidly changing situation, and sent soldiers into heavily entrenched enemy positions.¹⁰⁹ Cordesman advocated that interoperability between units will effectively diminish compartmentalization and increase intelligence sharing between conventional and special operations forces, and improve support to ground combat operations.¹¹⁰ National Defense Fellow, Judy Chizek, also provides insight into the challenges of sharing intelligence between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces in Afghanistan.

Judy Chizek acknowledged that U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces encountered challenges in sharing intelligence during the initial stages of OEF. The author addressed the incompatibility of equipment, as well as the lack of training and interoperability as the primary causes U.S. Army forces faced intelligence sharing difficulties in Afghanistan. Chizek demonstrated that conventional forces utilized improved ISR assets, such as the Joint

¹⁰⁷ Department of the Army. "101st Air Assault Division Lesson Learned Briefing." Center for Army Lesson Learned, 2002. Available online at <http://www.CALL.army.mil>.

¹⁰⁸ Cordesman, 46.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 41.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 47.

Tactical Terminal (JTT), to process and share intelligence in Afghanistan, but not all units were provided with the JTT equipment.¹¹¹ Additionally, soldiers were not adequately trained on the systems, thereby decreasing their abilities to operate the equipment and share intelligence to units in the region.¹¹² Chizek believed the primary reason U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces faced challenges in sharing intelligence was due to lack of interoperability. The author cited that "although special operations forces are often interoperable and innovative among themselves, in the past they have had difficulty communicating and coordinating with non-special operations assets."¹¹³ Chizek acknowledged that sharing intelligence did improve throughout OEF as conventional and special operations forces gradually corrected problems regarding equipment and interoperability, which previously hindered their ability to share intelligence.

The initial stages of the war against terrorism revealed various challenges U.S. conventional and special operations forces faced in sharing intelligence. The works cited, address difficulties in incompatible equipment, a lack of training, as well as problems of interoperability that did not facilitate sharing intelligence between U.S. Army forces in Afghanistan. The authors agreed these challenges occurred during the initial stages of the war, but are improving as conventional and special operations forces work together to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of sharing intelligence in support of combat operations in Afghanistan.

CONCLUSION

Throughout Chapter 4, sections reviewed historical combat and peacekeeping conflicts and illustrated intelligence sharing challenges between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces. This chapter examined U.S. military operations conducted by both U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces in Somalia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. These

¹¹¹ Judy G. Chizek. "Military Transformation: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance." (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 2002), 11.

¹¹² Ibid., 11.

¹¹³ Ibid., 18.

examples also demonstrated the effects that intelligence sharing, or the lack thereof, can have on military operations. Chapter 4 addressed not only difficulties encountered between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces, but also successful solutions that were implemented, and improved interoperability and intelligence sharing. Furthermore, this section examined the impact of equipment, training, and interoperability on U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces' ability to share intelligence and revealed their significance in military operations.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This monograph demonstrated that there is an intelligence sharing gap between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces and that there is a requirement for these forces to improve their ability to share intelligence with one another. Sharing intelligence between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces is particularly important due to the Army's transformation to a knowledge-centric force that emphasizes an increased reliance on intelligence.¹¹⁴ Additionally, sharing intelligence between units is also more important because of the increased integration of missions and operations between conventional and special operations forces in complex global military operations. This study examined intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces through the areas of doctrine, theory, and history, and revealed that many of the problems were caused by equipment, training, and interoperability challenges. Therefore, this chapter provides recommendations to improve U.S. Army conventional force capabilities that will strengthen intelligence sharing with special operations forces and enable the force to increase its ability to support the U.S. Army's Transformation Campaign Plan that advocates the increased need for sharing intelligence in a changing complex global environment.

EQUIPMENT

The U.S. Army is transforming to a force more reliant on its C4ISR capabilities than in the past and believes these increased capabilities will enable it to maintain greater situational understanding and interoperability between forces on the battlefield. The U.S. Army's Transformation Campaign Plan advocates that enhanced information technology and equipment capabilities will enable the force to achieve greater situational understanding.¹¹⁵ Upgrades and

¹¹⁴ DoD, ATCP, 4.

¹¹⁵ DoD, AI-TCP., 24.

improvements of intelligence and communications equipment will assist in improving the efficiency by which U.S. Army systems process and disseminate information. Although the U.S. Army's modernized IT and intelligence equipment will increase the production and parsing of intelligence, equipment training and interoperability are essential to improve intelligence sharing between forces. Equipment improvements alone will not enable U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces to improve their abilities to share intelligence with one another. The U.S. Army must ensure intelligence equipment is compatible between conventional and special operations units and military personnel are familiarized and capable of operating the IT systems. Although IT and equipment enhancements are acceptable methods to assist in the improvement of intelligence sharing between forces, the U.S. Army must also consider improving equipment compatibility and training between conventional and special operations forces.

Special operations intelligence equipment capabilities are often more advanced and modernized than U.S. Army conventional units' intelligence equipment and provide special operations forces with direct connectivity to national agencies at the strategic level, but often do not support connectivity with conventional forces. Today, U.S. Army conventional units continue conducting operations in environments with direct strategic impact, which also require coordination with national agencies and special operations forces. Unfortunately, U.S. Army conventional intelligence equipment is not always compatible with special operations equipment due to hardware, software, and system incompatibility challenges. Therefore, the U.S. Army must improve its intelligence equipment capabilities to provide conventional military forces with the ability to coordinate with special operations forces. If upgrades in intelligence equipment are not feasible because of funding or fielding issues, conventional and special operations forces must coordinate to ensure they utilize compatible hardware and software during military operations, which improve their ability to share intelligence. The U.S. Army must also familiarize and train military personnel to ensure they are capable of operating intelligence equipment. U.S. Army conventional or special operations forces may be required to alter or use different intelligence

equipment to maintain compatibility with one another, therefore units must ensure soldiers are familiarized with the different systems, which will allow them to operate the equipment and result in improved intelligence sharing.

Intelligence equipment enhancements for U.S. Army conventional forces will assist in improving intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces, but cannot single-handedly solve the problem. Conventional Army units, particularly at brigade level, require organic IT equipment that will permit units to exchange intelligence through voice, graphics, data and video teleconferencing. Systems such as the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) and JTT that the U.S. Army fields to special operations intelligence sections should also be provided to U.S. Army conventional brigades to provide them with full interoperability and access to intelligence databases when operating with special forces. The U.S. Army must also ensure intelligence equipment is compatible between conventional and special operations forces. Although U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces currently use the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS), conventional units traditionally operate with older and underdeveloped software, whereas special operations force receive consistent upgrades in software. The U.S. Army must field conventional forces the most up to date ASAS software to enable them to maintain compatibility with special operations forces ASAS and to fully support the sharing of intelligence between the two. The U.S. Army must also ensure personnel are familiarized with the systems to facilitate increased intelligence sharing. Familiarization and building the capability to operate equipment is achieved through training.

TRAINING

The U.S. Army must improve training between conventional and special operations forces to enhance their ability to share intelligence with one another. Training must not only include familiarization and refinement in using intelligence equipment, but should also include educating U.S. Army conventional and special operations soldiers on each other's capabilities and

organizational procedures, as well as conducting integrated training between conventional and special operations forces.

Training conventional forces to understand special operations forces must occur at all levels, from intelligence operator to commanders. U.S. Army conventional soldiers must understand the capabilities and methods of special operations forces in order to strengthen interoperability and intelligence sharing between the two. The U.S. Army intelligence school, with the assistance of special operations forces, should educate and train conventional intelligence soldiers on special operations intelligence capabilities, equipment, and intelligence requirements. This education and training will increase soldier knowledge and facilitate increased integration between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces. U.S. Army conventional intelligence soldiers will better understand the methods and capabilities of special operations forces and thereby exude confidence, rather than hesitance, in operating with their U.S. Army counterparts. Individual training and education is only one factor to assist conventional and special operations forces to share intelligence, unit training is also of great importance.

U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces must also increase combined training to improve their abilities to share intelligence. By increasing combined training, U.S. Army conventional forces will establish a greater understanding of special operations forces' capabilities and operating procedures, which will also improve their ability to integrate and coordinate operations more efficiently with special operations forces. Combined training will also enable the forces to develop relationships and familiarize themselves with the others' operational methods, thereby enhancing greater understanding and adaptability with one another. U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces should increase cooperative training through combined exercises, field maneuvers, and integrated combat training center (CTC) rotations. These shared training experiences will enable U.S. Army conventional and special

operations forces to operate more effectively, as well as improve intelligence sharing between one another.

In order to improve intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces, the U.S. Army must enhance training between the forces. Training must encompass improvements in education and hands-on application with intelligence equipment, individual programs, and organizational training. U.S. Army conventional units must coordinate with special operations forces affiliated within their regional focus areas and conducted combined training locally, as well as during major exercises, and more importantly through CTC rotations. These improvements in training will enhance conventional and special operations forces' ability to share intelligence and establish interoperability.

INTEROPERABILITY

Interoperability between conventional and special operations forces is essential to improve intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces. Conventional and special operations units will enhance their interoperability with one another through improvements in equipment and training, but must also strengthen their understanding of each other's culture, as well as their relations with one another to achieve interoperability. These intangible elements of establishing understanding, trust, and integration are difficult to gauge, but are essential in order for conventional and special operations forces to fully achieve interoperability and operate effectively as an integrated Army force.

U.S. Army conventional forces must understand the culture of special operations forces to improve interoperability between the forces. Although equipment and training are methods to achieve interoperability between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces, establishing equipment connectivity or conducting training between units may not always achieve effective interoperability. U.S. Army conventional forces must also enhance their understanding of special operations forces' culture, or beliefs, traits, behavioral patterns, and characteristics to

develop greater trust and integration. Increased interoperability will result in improved intelligence sharing between the two. Increased understanding will result in greater interoperability and will furthermore facilitate the conventional commanders' ability to visualize, describe, and direct forces, and more importantly assist the commander in making decisions on the battlefield. By increasing the conventional Army's understanding of special operations organizational culture, units will more likely establish better relationships and adapt to one another. Conventional understanding of special operations forces will also enhance the confidence and trust special operators place in conventional units, thereby creating more effective operating conditions for both forces. Additionally, liaison elements are important factors that will further improve interoperability between conventional and special operations forces.

Special operations forces often provide liaison elements to conventional units when conducting military operations with one another. These liaison elements greatly assist conventional Army units in developing a greater understanding of special operations forces, and serve as a stepping-stone in establishing trust, confidence and interoperability between the two forces. To further increase interoperability between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces, conventional units should also establish liaison elements within special operations units. These conventional liaison elements should be responsible for directly coordinating operations, integrating forces, and ensuring conventional and special operations forces maintain fully effective interoperability with one another. Increased interoperability will ultimately result in improved intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces.

U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces must strengthen their interoperability to improve intelligence sharing. Although equipment and training enhance interoperability, conventional forces must also improve intangible elements in understanding special operations culture and by strengthening relations with special operations forces to achieve full interoperability. By improving interoperability with one another, U.S. Army conventional

and special operations forces will operate and share intelligence more effectively, and will also assist the commander in visualizing, describing, and directing forces on the battlefield.

CONCLUSION

U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces must improve their ability to share intelligence with one another to adapt to the complex global environment and the increased requirement to operate as an integrated Army operational force. Additionally, intelligence sharing will be more important than ever in the Army's transformation to a knowledge-centric force, which is more reliant on relevant intelligence to obtain situation understanding and conduct successful military operations.¹¹⁶ This study reviewed intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces through the areas of doctrine, theory, and history and exemplified that equipment, training, and interoperability challenges caused several difficulties in intelligence sharing between conventional and special operations forces. Additionally, this paper provided recommendations for the U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces to strengthen their intelligence sharing capabilities through improvements in intelligence equipment, individual and organizational training, and interoperability with one another. Improvements in intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces will also support the Army's concept of transformation, which advocates the increased need for sharing intelligence between forces to adapt to and operate within a knowledge-centric operational environment. With the changing global surroundings, emerging military operational requirements, and the U.S. Army's transformation, Army conventional and special operations forces must improve their intelligence sharing to operate as an effective and integrated force capable of dominating the future battlefield.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 24.

APPENDIX A - ABBREVIATIONS

ASAS – All Source Analysis System

ATCP - Army Transformation Campaign Plan

AITCP - Army Intelligence Transformation Campaign Plan

ALTDM - Army Leader Training Development Model

ARSOF - Army Special Operations Forces

C4ISR - Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance

CTC - Combat Training Centers

FM - Field Manual

ISR - Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

IT - Information Technology

JDISS - Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System

JTT - Joint Tactical Terminal

OEF - Operation Enduring Freedom

SOCCE - Special Operations Command and Control Element

SOF - Special Operations Forces

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